BGP Hijacking: How Hackers Circumvent Internet Routing Security to Tear the Digital Fabric of Trust
ID: 638f68b3-acc0-5451-a727-c37c24f9a00c
STIX ID: report--638f68b3-acc0-5451-a727-c37c24f9a00c
Feed Name: CertiK Blog
This report explains how deficiencies in Internet routing trust models (BGP, RPKI, IRRs, and PKI) were exploited in two crypto-focused BGP hijacking incidents—KLAYswap (~$1.9M loss) and Celer Bridge (~$235k loss)—where attackers combined more-specific BGP announcements, IRR manipulation, and certificate issuance abuse to serve malicious frontends that redirected user transactions; it analyzes attack phases, systemic weaknesses, mitigation steps (RPKI/ROA/ROV, BGPSec, IRR improvements, IPFS) and surveys DLT-based proposals to strengthen routing/security.
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