Can passkeys be phished? Here's what attackers are doing instead
ID: cdc783c9-60db-579e-ac3e-0bf9f17c4979
STIX ID: report--cdc783c9-60db-579e-ac3e-0bf9f17c4979
Feed Name: ThreatLocker Blog
Microsoft's default passkey rollout and retirement of SMS/voice MFA has been leveraged by attackers who socially engineer employees (phone calls directing them to fake "passkey" enrollment pages) and use live operators to handle MFA challenges, enabling registration of attacker-controlled passkeys or account recovery that yields persistent access to Microsoft Entra accounts. Okta observed campaigns (tracked as O-UNC-066 and O-UNC-067) and recovered operator tools; recommended defenses include enforcing attestation (device-bound passkeys only), restricting where registration can occur, alerting on registration events, removing phishable fallbacks (SMS), and adding device trust controls so credentials alone cannot grant access.
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