Beyond the block: How adaptable Russian FIMI and Telegram’s gaps evade EU sanctions
ID: b032fc89-d250-569e-979e-557578277d13
STIX ID: report--b032fc89-d250-569e-979e-557578277d13
Feed Name: EUvsDisinfo
This report examines how Russian state-affiliated information manipulation and interference (FIMI) persists in the EU by migrating to and exploiting Telegram: actors use duplicate/replica channels, embassy and diplomatic accounts, Telegra.ph pages, forwarded messages, and calls to migrate audiences to alternative apps (e.g., Max) to evade sanctions. It highlights Telegram’s selective/inconsistent blocking and regulatory classification gaps under the EU Digital Services Act as enablers of sustained propaganda dissemination, and recommends coordinated monitoring, stronger platform accountability, and media literacy to reduce influence.
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