From help desk impersonation to AD CS abuse: Investigating ESC1 and ESC8 intrusion paths
ID: 043e4a23-faf9-5d6c-8ff6-758c47d63d76
STIX ID: report--043e4a23-faf9-5d6c-8ff6-758c47d63d76
Feed Name: Microsoft Security
Date Published: 2026-10-30
Date Updated: 2026-10-30
Author: Microsoft Security Research, Sagar Patil, Jesse Birch and Tal Tzhori
Microsoft Threat Intelligence investigated two related human-operated intrusions that began with Teams support-impersonation and Quick Assist remote sessions, followed by staging portable runtimes to perform host/network discovery and assess Active Directory Certificate Services. In Case 1 attackers abused an ESC1-vulnerable certificate template to obtain privileged certificates, executed DCSync, and later exfiltrated data; in Case 2 attackers used PetitPotam to coerce a domain controller’s NTLM authentication, relayed it to AD CS Web Enrollment (ESC8), obtained a domain-controller certificate, and used PKINIT for certificate-based Kerberos authentication. The report details the shared attack chain, detection and containment differences, investigation methods, mitigation guidance, Microsoft Defender coverage, advanced hunting queries, and IOCs.
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